The Phoenix Suns and High Variance Strategies

[nbo2]

When Wages of Wins says you can improve a team more cheaply by eliminating bad players vs. acquiring great ones, they have a very good point.

This year's Suns team is a lesson in what building a team around 1/2/3 year Adjusted Plus Minus variants can do when you factor in variance, uncertainty, and basketball knowledge/common sense (e.g. diminishing returns with multiple ball-handlers, increasing returns with multiple floor-spacers around 1-2 penetrators, etc.).

Suns added:

Eric Bledsoe (very positive)
Gerald Green (positive/very uncertain, now putting in effort)
Channing Frye (positive, fits role, return from injury)
Miles Plumlee (almost no NBA data so very uncertain)
Full Season of Morris twins (slightly negative/very uncertain, but improving and fit roles)

Suns subtracted:

Jared Dudley (average/high uncertainty)
Wesley Johnson (very negative)
Marcin Gortat (slightly negative/high uncertainty)
Shannon Brown (negative)
Luis Scola (slightly negative/uncertain)
Michael Beasley (very negative, didn't put in effort)
Sebastian Telfair (negative)
Jermaine O'Neal (old)

Given that this year it pays off to be very bad (and all years it pays off to make the playoffs), the Suns going high variance is a great strategy, which we should probably see more NBA teams attempt. In the MLB, the Oakland A's have gone with high variance strategies, as the value of 81 wins vs 70 wins is much less than the value of 90 wins vs 81 wins. We should see something similar in the NBA, especially when factoring in lottery odds.

[Dr Positivity]

Yep, they had some absolute trainwrecks on their team last season. CHA improving this year is similar by going from the worst frontcourt of the modern era to ok production has been similar

To me the Suns improvement comes down to simple basketball concepts though. First they added an all-star caliber player in Bledsoe. Then Dragic made a huge leap from average starting point to all-star caliber. Going from 2 average starters (2013 Dragic/Gortat) as your best players to 2 all-stars or near it is pretty freaking huge. I am surprised Dragic is not getting more MIP buzz because going from a 15/7/.54 TS/109 ORTG player to 19/6/.605/120 ORTG is a massive leap, he is now producing like Lillard, Lawson, Conley. Producing that efficiently at a high-ish volume is legitimate all-star stuff

The Suns surprising year reminds me most of the Jazz in the first Al Jefferson/Paul Millsap year where we expected them to be terrible/tank/etc. and they ended up mid 40s and in the playoffs. 2 great players and then a competent supporting cast around them goes a long way. Except I think Dragic and Bledsoe have been better than those guys offensively, even before considering that they come without the defensive price the Jazz paid too

[Bobbofitos]

The Suns surprising year reminds me most of the Jazz in the first Al Jefferson/Paul Millsap year where we expected them to be terrible/tank/etc. and they ended up mid 40s and in the playoffs. 2 great players and then a competent supporting cast around them goes a long way. Except I think Dragic and Bledsoe have been better than those guys offensively, even before considering that they come without the defensive price the Jazz paid too

Al Jefferson has never been "great".

[Mike G]

Was it great "strategy" that the Suns lost a bunch of their players, and their remaining players all improved dramatically?
Did one cause the other?

Their improvement is from the improvement of their current players. Why not just use the strategy of making your players improve? It works every time it works.

[nbo2]

In my opinion it was a good strategy to fill their team with very high variance players given it doesn't pay to be mediocre. There is more uncertainty about the level of young players as they don't have a lot of NBA data and could improve. Other options might be more consistent but don't have the same upside/downside.

Of course they were lucky their players did improve so much, but without allowing for the possibility of a tanked year they might not have had such upside.

Another thing worth mentioning is that apparently their defensive coordinator, Mike Longabardi (former Celtics and Bulls assistant), is a huge reason behind their defense being respectable despite their personnel.

[Mike G]

I have to admit I don't know what a high variance player is.

Before the season, would someone have been able to identify Green or Tucker as anything but marginal journeymen nearing the expiration date (28) for such players?
The Morris brothers both stalled out in their development in year 2. What would indicate they'd suddenly take off in year 3 ?

Dragic already made a leap 2 years ago. What are the odds that such a player makes another such leap at age 27 ?
Bledsoe was on the rise and continues to be. Channing seems same as ever; more the scoring specialist, if anything.

After the fact, we see major changes in these players. But how would you identify them in advance?

[Crow]

"Marcin Gortat (slightly negative/high uncertainty)"

I had without detailed knowledge considered him a steady player, maybe from his demeanor. It appears I am wrong. Anyone with any analysis of why his gamescore values have jerked around by what appears to be a lot? Type of opponent he can / can't handle. Type ofgame or type of teammate game that helps / hurts? Seems like they might be as jerky this season as last season. I haven't calculated the variance. Not enough time now.

[nbo2]

I have to admit I don't know what a high variance player is.

Ah, I should point out I'm using 2 year APM ratings from http://www.gotbuckets.com and referencing the ratings and standard errors from the past few years.

[Crow]

By those numbers Gortat was rated pretty steadily terrible on offensive impact (rated much better than -3 only once) and steadily improving on defense for 2 year estimates. His volatility was at game level.

There is probably significant difference between gambling on a high game level volatility guy and a high volatility multi=season APM guy.

[repole]

Before the season, would someone have been able to identify Green or Tucker as anything but marginal journeymen nearing the expiration date (28) for such players?
The Morris brothers both stalled out in their development in year 2. What would indicate they'd suddenly take off in year 3 ?

I think the Suns are less about genuine player improvement, and more about guys having their strengths utilized in ways they previously weren't.

Green's historically been able to shoot the 3 ball pretty well, and if you factor in his DLeague stint in 2011-12, his struggles from outside with Indiana quickly begin to look like an outlier for a guy who fit into that system remarkably poorly and started having confidence issues. I don't think it should have taken a genius to figure that a version of Gerald Green limited to spending most of his time behind the arc and out in transition could be a useful scorer off the bench. He's taken remarkably few 2 point jump shots this season, that's a pretty quick recipe for increasing efficiency.

Marcus Morris' stat line isn't much different from the Houston version of him last year outside of a slight up tick in usage and getting to a respectable steal rate.

Markieff to me is the biggest legitimate improvement. He's improved his eFG% on jumpers significantly (despite cutting back on 3s), and has been getting inside and getting to the line far more often than he did last season.

Dragic's year looks like mostly incremental improvement across the board as well as the increased focus on scoring and being a secondary ball handler at times having a positive effect on his game.

Tucker's stat line is nearly identical to his line last year, though he's doing it a bit differently (more 3s and FTs), even though it hasn't really changed much production wise.

Frye's pretty much the same player he was in 2010-2011.

Plumlee was essentially a total unknown, but he showcased his athleticism at the draft combine, and was a quality rebounder in college, so it shouldn't really shock anyone to see him doing a solid job of protecting the rim and rebounding. He's displayed a more advanced offensive skill set than most expected, but even so he has the worst oRtg of anyone in the Suns' regular rotation, so it's not as if his contributions on that end have been the difference.



A lot has had to go right for the Suns to get where they are at this point, there's no way they could have expected Plumlee to be quite what he is, or Markieff to have improved as much as he has, but good things happen when some low risk/high reward types pan out and you put your players in roles that set them up for success.

[Mike G]

By those numbers Gortat was rated pretty steadily terrible on offensive impact (rated much better than -3 only once) and steadily improving on defense for 2 year estimates..

Using b-r.com's most used lineups/combos, one can get an informed guess at Marcin Gortat's influence in common lineups. He started all 61 games he was in, playing about 45% of all team minutes.

Adding him to 4 other players, we see the direct result of the team's improvements with/without him.
Of others listed as Center, only Jermaine O'Neal started any games (4), and they total just 1300 minutes.

Adding MG to groups of 3 or 2, there is considerable overlap, thus the inflated 'minutes' total.

Code: Select all

combos   Min    eFG%     Pts    ORb%    TRb%    TO
4+MG     288   -.004    -6.8    -5.4    -4.1   +1.6
3+MG    1494   -.037   -11.6    -5.6    -6.3   + .6
2+MG    4357   -.016    -5.7    -3.0    -3.9   + .8

Turnovers are per 100 possessions, and + is an undesirable number.
These are team-opponent differentials, so we can't distinguish whether the changes are offensive or defensive. Either way, they're just bad all around.

[nbo2]

Also remember Jeremias Engelmann works for the Suns as a Basketball Operations Analyst (http://www.nba.com/suns/news/directory.html). I'm pretty sure his APM/RAPM work for them involves ways to study player combinations, not just player values season by season.